Rothschild displays little curiosity about the details and diversity of pregnant women's experiences. She does not show much concern or empathy for how women understand or experience the choices they make about prenatal testing, nor for the anxieties and conflicting emotions that may frame these choices. Although she has a chapter entitled "The Parents," this chapter does not actually explore parents' perspectives, but is rather a description of our usage of contemporary prenatal procedures. When she does try to enter into women's experiences, her descriptions are overgeneralized, and they sometimes come off as condescending or romanticized. For instance, she claims without support or citation, "Women candidates for prenatal testing find themselves distanced from the abstracted language of scientific probability. . . . A medically and statistically oriented discourse has little relevance for decisions they are making and the dilemmas they face" (213). And elsewhere, "The pregnancy experience directly contradicts antagonistic self-other dualisms" (217). Surely, some women resent and feel alienated from their fetuses, and thereby experience pregnancy as an antagonistic dualism.
I have several concerns about Rothschild's use and presentation of empirical data, which can be divided into four categories.
Insufficient or Inappropriate Citations of Sources
Although Rothschild offers readings of the ideas of historical figures such as the Marquis de Condorcet and Charles Darwin, she relies almost exclusively upon secondary sources rather than primary texts. Some of her specific empirical claims receive no citation at all. Late in the book she refers without citation to conclusions gathered from "my own interviews" (196), but she includes no information about whom she interviewed, her methodology, or anything else about these studies or how she drew her conclusions from them.
Distortions of Empirical Facts
Rothschild's hyperbolic language sometimes distorts or misrepresents the facts. For example, citing Barbara Katz Rothman's claim that women experience pressure to use prenatal diagnostic technologies once they are available, she states that this availability "narrows women's choices" (191, emphasis added). But if there were no prenatal diagnosis options, women would have no (relevant) choices at all, so it is hard to imagine how the introduction of a new option could narrow their choices. On the strongest reading, we could claim that the introduction of the technology replaces one choice-free situation with another, and even this seems overstated. The point that social pressures and medical routines conspire to make women's choices about prenatal testing less than fully autonomous or reflective could be more effectively expressed without the exaggeration.
Hasty Inferences
Rothschild is sometimes too quick in her inferences from empirical results. For example, she cites studies showing that prospective parents look for intelligence in sperm donors, and for a warm and nurturing personality in surrogate mothers. From this, she concludes that our attitude towards donor traits is "gendered" (128). But these results are fully explained by the differences in the processes: whereas sperm donors are responsible for passing on genes, surrogate mothers pass on negligible amounts of genetic material (unless they are also egg donors) but are responsible for caring for a fetus for nine months. Hence it makes sense that we would care that a sperm donor possess a feature we want our child to inherit, like intelligence, and about a surrogate mother's care-giving potential; no appeal to gender is needed or warranted by these facts.
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Implausible Intentional Attributions
Rothschild has a tendency to attribute reasons and goals to various social practices without empirical justification, and sometimes quite implausibly. So for instance, she claims, "Obtaining fetal cells from the mother's blood is the ultimate goal of prenatal diagnostic research" (100, emphasis added). But this can't be right-surely, obtaining the cells is only an instrumental goal for researchers. Elsewhere, she claims that a "reason" for the growing popularity of triple-screen testing is that "since blood tests are done routinely in prenatal care to monitor the health of the woman, the fetus's health can be tested without the woman being properly informed that tests of substances are being done" (81). But even if we accept that the routinization of triple-screen tests has weakened the informed-consent process (as I do), her claim that this is a reason for the popularity of the test requires that she assign implausibly nefarious motives to someone (although it is not clear whom).
While Rothschild is wisely cautious in her critique of the medical establishment, she has nothing but vitriol for bioethicists: "Isolated, insulated, trapped in an individualist, legalistic framework and the language or 'rights,' mainstream bioethics discourse fails to explore or affect the critical points of decision-making in medical practice. . . . Supporting and justifying the status quo, the discourse is an exercise in marginality" (158). She accuses "mainstream bioethics" of incautious and full-throated support of prenatal testing in the name of individual autonomy and control. The nerve center of "mainstream bioethics," for her, is the Hastings Center, which she accuses of "epitomizing this mainstream" (164). This is ironic, given that the Hastings Center sponsored the working group on disability and prenatal testing that published the pathbreaking volume, Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights (2000) , which is devoted to just the kind of critiques that Rothschild claims bioethics does not provide. In fact, Rothschild herself cites many such critiques, but she portrays all those she cites as lone voices unheard amid the crowd. While many bioethicists fit Rothschild's stereotype, a long list of prominent bioethicists from all points on the political spectrum have vocally opposed individualist, rights-based approaches. This list includes Carl Elliot, Leon Kass, Edward Pellegrino, Daniel Callahan, Susan Sherwin, Adrienne Asch, and Hilde Lindemann, to name just a few. Given that this partial list includes two chairmen of President George W. Bush's bioethics committee, one elected member of the Royal Society of Canada, two American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) lifetime Hypatia achievement award winners, one ASBH president-elect, several distinguished chair holders, the founder of the Hastings Center, and the former editor of the Hastings Center Report, it is hard to see how all of these people could be occluded from the view of the profession.
The Dream of the Perfect Child is billed as the "culmination of almost two decades of research," and indeed, the book is perhaps over-researched. Rothschild tries to summarize so much secondary literature that no one's arguments or studies get much sustained attention, and it is difficult to ferret out her own voice amidst the melee. Her positive suggestion is that we use the work of feminist and disability theorists in order to construct an alternative discourse about prenatal testing. However, she does not so much draw upon these bodies of work as recapitulate them in broad strokes. She accepts without qualification a straightforward version of the social model of disability, without attention to any of the sophisticated, sensitive literature that has emerged concerning the limitations of this model. From feminist philosophy she takes platitudinous messages such as that "the female subject is a relational being" (215) and "at the heart of the scientific model is its rationalist premise, rooted in the oppositional categories of Cartesian dualism: reason/emotion, mind/body, self/Other, male/female" (23).
Surprisingly, although Rothschild introduces feminist care ethics as the cure-all for our inappropriate eugenic impulses, she never explains how an ethic of care is supposed to bear specifically on the moral problems surrounding prenatal testing. The closest she comes to offering an explicit connection is in her claim that "because the decisions that people make about prenatal diagnosis exhibit 'context, experience, and particularity,' they do not fit the reigning abstract, isolating model of decision-making" (223). She offers no evidence for this characterization, but surely, if there is anything to care ethics, then the characterization applies to most decision making, and is not specific to the context of prenatal diagnosis. She concludes that "feminist visions of the future strive for connection" (226) and "feminist ethics reassert focus on woman and fetus as a unit" (224), but she does not explain how this turns into any specific take-home message with respect to prenatal testing. Rothschild ends by recommending that we replace "the dream of 'perfect babies' with the goal of health and well-being for all children born, with images of children who are wanted and cared for" (227). This is a noble vision, but it is not clear how it should direct our thinking about prenatal testing; after all, boosters argue that extensive prenatal testing furthers the goal of ensuring that all children born are healthy, wanted, and cared for.
In the end, it remains unclear what Rothschild's own objection to the eugenic impulse actually is. She has, for instance, no response (other than a disapproving attitude) toward a serious challenge like Arthur Caplan's: "[If it were possible to] eliminate diseases such as Tay-Sachs, thalassemia, or Hurler's syndrome . . . from the human population by germ-line alterations, is there any convincing moral reason why this should not be done?" (quoted on 169). Most of her readers will come to this book already believing that there is something ethically repugnant about our contemporary culture of fetal perfectionism. But this should not hide the fact that she offers little argument for why we should feel this repugnance. Rothschild's book addresses issues that are important for feminist philosophers to think about, and for this she deserves our gratitude. However, we must judge such a book on the strength of its scholarship and its argumentation, and not just on the basis of our sympathy with its thesis and our resonance with its moral sensibilities.
Notes
See page 61 and elsewhere. I give future page references to this work in paren-1. theses in the text.
For already-classic original discussions of each of these three topics, see, for 2. example, Duden 1993; Parens and Asch 2000; and Rothman 1992, respectively. Of course, these attitudes are trivially gendered, in the sense that only men can 3. donate sperm and only women can be surrogate mothers-but presumably Rothschild was trying to make a stronger point than this.
